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We perform content analysis on Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) responses from 2003 to 2010, 
focusing on the extent to which firms account for indirect emissions and have exhibited 
convergence in carbon reporting. We also examine standardization in reporting and the variation 
of reporting behavior across industry and country. We find that the CDP has produced a mixed 
record of improved transparency. In some areas, such as scope 2 emissions, the CDP has 
demonstrated an increase in transparency in later years. However, the transparency and quality of 
direct emissions and scope 3 emissions have not improved over time. Japanese and EU firms 
have increased transparency, while U.S. firms have decreased transparency. Energy-intensive 
industries have either increased transparency or remained the same, while less energy-intensive 
industries have become less transparent. We demonstrate some evidence of a learning effect 
among firms after participating in the CDP survey. 
2. Introduction 
Strategic responses to climate change have varied immensely across firms. Some firms have 
been transparent and release detailed emissions data to the public. Other firms remain opaque, 
keeping carbon emissions, electricity use, and other climate-related business activities removed 
from public scrutiny. A wide array of research has addressed the determinants of corporate 
disclosure of environmental performance, sustainability, and carbon emissions (Peters and Romi, 
2010; Cormier et al., 2005; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Kolk and Perego, 2010; Kolk, 2005; 
Haddock-Fraser and Fraser, 2008; Chen and Bouvain, 2009; Berthelot et al., 2003). In this paper, 
we examine trends relating to carbon disclosure and report on the extent to which firms have 
increased transparency over time across a wide range of emissions-related activities. In particular, 
we focus on Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions, which include a broad array of indirect business 
activity and product lifecycle impacts, which have received much less attention from formal 
institutions than have Scope 1 (direct carbon emissions). Further, we examine the convergence 
and standardization of carbon reporting. We examine whether information reported by firms has 
become more standardized, as well as how transparency varies across industries. Additionally, 
we examine the extent to which firms have begun to use similar language regarding climate 
change. We demonstrate that the CDP has produced a mixed record of improved transparency. 
On one hand, public disclosures have improved in quality, particularly for Scope 2 emissions. On 
the other hand, an increasing percentage of disclosures remain available only to institutional 
investors, and while an increasing number of firms have disclosed Scope 1 and Scope 3 
emissions, the percentage of firms disclosing quality information has not substantially increased 
over time. 
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3. Theory and Literature Review 
3.1. Motivations for transparency and disclosure 
Significant attention has been paid to the relationship between information disclosure and 
transparency and improved management. For firm managers, improved information may lead to 
improved efficiency, reduction in waste, lower costs of capital, and improved shareholder value. 
For policymakers and government officials, improved transparency offers the opportunity to 
achieve low-cost environmental improvements without heavy-handed government intervention. 
Empirical findings suggest that firms pursue an open disclosure policy due to investor (Reid and 
Toffel, 2009) or employee (Spence, 2009) pressure, legal liabilities and securities laws (Skinner, 
1994),,increased growth rates and shareholder value (Lev, 1992; Blacconiere and Patten, 1994), 
improved terms of trade with suppliers and customers (Lev, 1992), reduced regulatory 
intervention (Lev, 1992; Walker and Salt, 2006), and reduced cost and increased access to capital 
(Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Botosan, 1997). For example, in Botosan and Plumlee (2002), the 
authors find that reduced capital costs are limited to disclosures in annual reports, and that timely 
disclosures lead to increased stock price volatility and an increase of capital costs. 
One perspective suggests that an array of managerial and economic incentives drive firm 
transparency. Firms voluntarily disclose in order to improve shareholder value (Lyon and Kim, 
2011; Barber, 2007). If firm managers do not provide credible information, investors will either 
assume the worst or will have to spend more time collecting information from other information 
sources and stock prices will decrease (Cormier and Magnan, 2003). On the other hand, releasing 
environmental information involves releasing proprietary information such as environmentally 
related capital expenditures, fuel use, environmental investments, and other environmental 
liabilities or commitments (Cormier et al., 2005; Li et al., 1997; Berry, 1984; Peters and Romi, 
2010). 
A second perspective relates firm transparency to external institutional pressures (Knox-Hayes 
and Levy, 2011). While international governance efforts and the increasing globalization of 
commerce has led multinational business to be thought of as ‘global’ and ‘stateless’, empirical 
evidence demonstrates that much of the variation in firm reporting behavior can be attributed to 
national institutional characteristics, such as the stringency of the regulatory environment and the 
environmentalist culture of a country (Kolk, 2005; Walker and Salt, 2006; Peters and Romi, 
2010).  Industry factors are important, as well. Industries that engage in more polluting activity 
tend to be more likely to voluntarily disclose environmental information (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006). Firm-specific factors (e.g., size, profitability, degree leveraged, media exposure, 
ownership dispersion, participation on the board of directors by external stakeholders) increase 
firms’ likelihood of voluntarily disclosing environmental information (Cormier and Magnan, 
2003; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; 
Stanny and Ely, 2008).  
Previous research has demonstrated wide variations in strategic decision-making of firms related 
to carbon disclosure (Kolk and Pinske, 2004; Kolk and Pinske, 2005), carbon management (Kolk 
and Pinske, 2004; Kolk and Pinske, 2005; Sullivan, 2009), and investment in energy-efficient 
technologies (Hoffman, 2007). This variation can be explained by institutional, economic, and 
managerial determinants of information disclosure. While there is an emerging understanding of 
these pressures that lead to increased reporting, much less is known about the quality of firm 
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reporting and the extent to which the disclosure of environmental performance leads to or 
reflects changes in behavior (Cormier et al., 2005; Chen and Bouvain, 2009). Indeed, several 
authors have called for increased investigation into the content of environmental disclosure, as 
well as extensions beyond a simple dichotomous measurement of reporting behavior (Kolk and 
Perego, 2010; Chen and Bouvain, 2009; Stiller and Daub, 2007). 
3.2. Convergence in Environmental Disclosure 
Convergence in reporting standards and in discourses of CDP participants and major carbon-
emitting firms facilitates transparency, comparability, and coordination. The standards and 
framing used in an arena can significantly impact firm operations and profits, as well as policy 
and political power. Carbon offset standards are an example of this (Gillenwater et al., 2007; 
Millard-Ball and Ortolano, 2010; Bushnell, 2010). Hawley and Williams (2005) make clear this 
link between corporate governance and environmental concerns in the CDP's framing of 
disclosure and fiduciary obligations more broadly.   
The sizable literature on standard-setting organizations (SSOs) also relates to this research.  
While the CDP is not an SSO, its effectiveness in fostering disclosure and accountability relies in 
part on standardized disclosed information.  Much of the standardization process and its value 
has been observed in the technology and communications industries (e.g., (Chiao et al., 2007; 
Schmalensee, 2009).  SSOs can greatly impact investment decisions, firm coordination, and 
incentives to innovate, yet their policymaking process is less well understood. In the 
environmental arena, Boström and Hallström (2010) investigate power relations within global 
environmental SSOs and note how some nongovernmental organizations like the CDP face 
major difficulties in setting standards in a global, multi-stakeholder context. They suggest that 
organizational evolution should mitigate those difficulties over time, but fundamental 
mismatches between NGO operations and the standard-setting process will limit the emergence 
of standards -- even as the SSO still impacts partners. 
According to institutional theory, rules and norms govern social behavior and shape interactions. 
Within this perspective, individuals or firm managers conform to the institutional symbols, rules, 
or regulations that they perceive to be external and objective (Cormier et al., 2005). The 
emergence of an institution produces social structures, rules, and routines that constrain 
individual actions. For an individual manager or organization, a safe way to justify an action is to 
imitate the practice of another organization that is widely believed or perceived to be a model 
(Cormier et al., 2005). This pressure is supported by socially acceptable beliefs and cultural 
frameworks. As firms attempt to conform to these beliefs and cultural frameworks, individual 
actions – such as environmental disclosure – become legitimized (Cormier et al., 2005).  
Firms may also benefit from transparency through the process of collecting information. Firms 
that implement environmental management systems are known to have improved compliance 
records and have improved environmental performance (Potoski and Prakash, 2005b; Potoski 
and Prakash, 2005a; Prakash and Potoski, 2006).  As transparency becomes routine, it may 
become self-reinforcing, as well.  
A role of transparency may be to help disseminate improved management behavior, especially in 
areas that are not seen as core strategic activities by firms (Lyon and Maxwell, 2007). According 
to Lyon and Maxwell (2004), firms participate in voluntary environmental agreements in order to 
deflect the enactment or enforcement of more costly, mandatory regulation. The sponsor of the 
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program, however, has incentive to disseminate best practices across participating and non-
participating firms, in order to improve environmental behavior. These best practices may 
disseminate even without the explicit intervention of government, due to industry laggards 
imitating industry leaders (Lange, 2009).  Because energy efficiency is frequently not seen as a 
core strategic activity, firms do not object to the dissemination of these practices (Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2007). Supporting this hypothesis, a study on the convergence of human resources 
management across international firms suggested that imitation of best practices was more 
common in “non-strategic” areas, such as human resources management, as opposed to finance 
and strategy (Carr and Pudelko, 2006).  
Several studies have attempted to examine the convergence in reporting behavior and the content 
and standardization of disclosed information. It remains unclear whether environmental 
disclosure has increased over time, and whether firms have converged on specific reporting 
practices or standards. Considerable variation exists regarding reporting, the use of third-party 
assurance, and the content disclosed in corporate sustainability reports (Chen and Bouvain, 2009; 
Kolk, 2008; Kolk and Perego, 2010).  Kolk (2005) finds that, despite trends of increasing 
transparency and reporting, firms have diverged in reporting practices and standards. In contrast, 
Cormier, et al. (2005) do not find increasing disclosure yet find within-industry convergence 
regarding the types of information disclosed . Brammer and Pavelin (2008) suggest that while 
convergence within industry is common, nearly all variation across firms is attributable to 
differences across industries. Nevertheless, inconsistent measurement techniques and standards, 
spotty verification practices, and a widely varying lexicon make the assessment of environmental 
reporting difficult. 
Due to globalization and the rise of the ‘global stateless firm’, it is unclear the extent to which 
firms conform to international standards that are common across countries, or whether national 
standards, laws, and institutions are more likely to dictate corporate transparency. Kolk (2005) 
finds increasing regionalization of reporting practices amont firms that produce an environmental 
report. 
3.3. The increasing role of Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions 
Greenhouse gas emissions are measured as either direct or indirect. Direct emissions are emitted 
from sources immediately controlled or owned by the reporting firm, and indirect emissions 
originate from an external source as a result of the reporting firm’s actions (WBSCD/WRI, 2011). 
Scope 1 emissions are equivalent to direct emissions, and indirect emissions are divided into 
Scope 2 and Scope 3 (WBSCD/WRI, 2004). While direct emissions have received most attention 
from government, carbon footprints, which include Scope 2 (indirect emissions from electricity 
use) and Scope 3 (emissions from product lifecycle, supply chain, and distribution), have 
received increasing attention in both technical and policy literature (Piecyk, 2010; Prakash, 
2002) 
Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions are indirect greenhouse gas emissions that cannot be 
classified as Scope 1 or Scope 2. In CDP surveys, commonly listed sources of Scope 3 emissions 
are “Business Travel”, “External Distribution”, “Use and Disposal of Products”, and “Company 
Supply Chain”. In emissions reporting schemes, Scope 3 is often listed as an optional 
complement to the mandatory Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions (Huang et al., 2009; WBCSD/WRI, 
2001; WBSCD/WRI, 2004). 
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Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions may dwarf a firm’s direct emissions, accounting for as much as 
75% of a firm’s carbon footprint, and the types of Scope 3 emissions that are important vary 
greatly by industry (Huang et al., 2009). While Scope 2 and 3 emissions may be bigger than a 
firm’s direct emissions, accounting procedures and standards remain highly variable and 
uncertain for these classes of emissions (Huang et al., 2009; Piecyk, 2010; Kolk et al., 2008). 
Research addressing Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions have focused on two lines of research: how 
to calculate Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions for a firm, industry, or geographical location (e.g. 
(Kennedy et al., 2010; Gentil et al., 2009; Larsen and Hertwich, 2009; Stolaroff et al., 2009; 
Piecyk, 2010), and whether or not firms are accounting for these emissions (Kolk et al., 2008). 
To date, most research on the Carbon Disclosure Project has focused on its role in facilitating the 
disclosure of carbon strategies and direct emissions or simply whether firms choose to participate 
or not (e.g. (Kolk and Pinske, 2005; Kolk et al., 2008; Lyon and Kim, 2011). While Kolk, et al. 
(2008) found that the CDP has generated increasing responses over time, the quality of responses 
was highly variable. They find that, although Scope 2 emissions tend to be reported in 
congruence with direct emissions, by 2007 both the quantity and quality of Scope 3 emissions 
reporting remained highly discretionary. Further, they note an array of competing standards and 
protocols used to account for Scope 3 emissions, such as the UK Department of for Environment, 
Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
EPA Climate Leaders GHG Inventory Guidance, the International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association (IPECA), and the American Petroleum Institute (API), 
that complicates the comparability of any reported numbers. Kolk et al. (2008) note that some 
firms, such as the German utility E.ON, use different protocols and accounting standards in 
different countries.  This heterogeneity of reporting demonstrates that carbon commensuration is 
not just a technical exercise, but a social and political process. 
3.4. Research contributions 
This research builds on earlier work on environmental reporting, carbon disclosure, and the CDP 
that has found significant variation in individual firm behavior (Sullivan, 2009) and variation in 
the quality of reporting and verification procedures (Cerin, 2002; Fonseca, 2010). Numerous 
researchers have called for research that assesses the impacts of global reporting standards and 
the use of text analytics software as a more reliable method of analyzing content than word 
counts or investigator coding, and work that “examines the quality of assurance statements, 
rather than merely their adoption” (Kolk and Perego, 2010). Further, other researchers have 
bemoaned the lack of longitudinal assessments conducted (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2008).  
We go further than existing research by taking advantage of CDP data to uncover the extent to 
which environmental behavior by firms has converged in the area of climate change. Further, we 
use quantitative methods to measure the extent to which the discourse and lexicon about carbon 
management has converged among major corporations. In contrast to existing research that 
largely employs dichotomous measurements (e.g. (Peters and Romi, 2010; Kolk, 2005; Kolk, 
2008; Kolk and Perego, 2010), we move beyond simple dichotomous indicators of disclosure by 
focusing on the types and quality of information disclosed. In contrast to cross-sectional data or 
two- or three-period data (e.g. (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Kolk, 
2005; Kolk, 2008; Kolk et al., 2008; Kolk and Perego, 2010), we take advantage of a 
longitudinal panel from 2003 – 2010. Additionally, in contrast to using coding mechanisms that 
 7 
rely on subjective measurements of disclosure behavior (e.g. (Cormier and Magnan, 2003; 
Cormier et al., 2005), we employ text analytics, similar to Chen and Bouvain (2009), in order to 
achieve a great deal of standardization in the content analysis and to allow us to assemble a 
larger sample of firms over many years. This approach allows us to draw substantive conclusions 
about carbon management and the standardization of measurement and management techniques 
across firms, both within and across industry, and to observe changes in the implementation of 
carbon management. 
4. Greenhouse Gas Reporting Standards 
Responding firms report several greenhouse gas accounting methodologies in their responses. 
Appendix A describes several of these standards’ important characteristics. We highlight four 
here: WBSCD/WRI Greenhouse Gas Protocol, ISO standards, IPCC, and DEFRA.  
Developed in collaboration with multiple private, public, and non-governmental organizations, 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development/ World Resources Institute 
(WBSCD/WRI) Greenhouse Gas Protocol is the most commonly listed response in all four years. 
It is distinguished by its universality and adaptability to most industrial sectors and reporting 
goals, as well as its classification of greenhouse gases into the three “scopes.”  
Second, the International Standards Organization (ISO) publishes ISO 14064 for greenhouse gas 
accounting. Part 1 of ISO 14064, organizational-level GHG reporting, closely corresponds with 
the WRI GHG Protocol (Weng and Boehmer, 2006).  However, the WRI GHG Protocol details 
how to account for GHG emissions and ISO 14064 sets a minimum standard without detailing 
specific methods (Wintergreen and Delaney, 2007).   
Established in 1988 by World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a 
scientific agency responsible for publishing the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse 
Gas Inventories. Along with other IPCC publications, countries use this publication to report to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is published in 
five volumes with specific methodologies for four sectors: energy, industrial processes and 
product use, agriculture, forestry, and other land use, and waste (IPCC, 2006). 
Fourth, the UK’s Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) publishes the 
“Guidance on how to measure and report your greenhouse gas emissions.” This publication 
intends to help UK organizations of all sizes measure, reduce, and set reduction targets for 
greenhouse gas emissions. It was designed to be comparable to various other standards, such as 
ISO 14064 and the Carbon Trust Standard.  At a basic level, DEFRA recommends calculating 
GHG emissions by multiplying activity data by emissions factors (DEFRA, 2009). 
5. Research Design 
5.1. Overview  
Beginning in 2003, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), an investor-led non-profit, began 
surveying large firms regarding their carbon related risks and strategies. Since 2006, the survey 
has been distributed to a wide range of firms across numerous industries.  This study explores the 
content and convergence of firm responses to the CDP over time through two primary techniques. 
 8 
First, we assess the content provided in firm responses to emissions disclosure by using text 
analysis software to determine whether a firm provided a numerical response to emissions 
information. These data are useful in demonstrating trends related to the disclosure of types of 
emissions. Second, we assess firm responses to open-ended questions about their emissions 
accounting standards and verification behavior. We use a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to 
demonstrate the concentration of common keywords in firm responses regarding emissions 
accounting methodology. We also track the frequency of numerous competing emissions 
reporting standards to assess the extent to which firms have converged on specific reporting 
techniques and standards and highlight the extent to which firms use similar methodologies over 
time. 
5.2. Data Description 
Since 2003, firms submit completed CDP surveys each year before May 31. The disclosed data 
usually come from one or two years prior to the survey deadline. Firms responding to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project were given the option of designating their responses as either publicly or 
privately accessible. Private responses are available exclusively to institutional investors. Only 
public responses were examined in this study. From 2003-2010, approximately 2,900 unique 
firms publicly responded to the survey. Table 1 below lists the responding firm counts for each 
year the survey was issued. 
Responding firms from 2007-2010 represented eight sectors: consumer discretionary, consumer 
staples, energy, financials, health care, industrials, information technology, materials, 
telecommunications, and utilities. The sample includes industry leaders and other major firms 
worldwide. 
 
<insert Table 1 about here> 
5.3. Assessing Convergence in Carbon Disclosure 
First, to assess the extent of convergence in firm responses, we analyze firms’ responses over 
time to questions pertaining to Scope 1, Scope 2, and Scope 3 emissions, as well as a question 
pertaining to whether or not these responses were externally verified. Undertaking a longitudinal 
study of the panel was difficult, due to the changing survey format of the questions over time. 
(This might explain why many studies rely on binary measurements of whether or not a firm 
responded to the CDP.) From 2003 to 2006, Scope 1 and 2 emissions data were combined into a 
single question, and no external verification question existed for these years. Also, until 2007, 
the responses to the emission questions were in an open-ended, multi-paragraph response format. 
For 2007, 2008, and 2010, the Scope 3 emissions question was divided into separate questions 
based on the type of Scope 3 emissions. And from 2007 to 2010, questions became numerical 
response questions.  
In order to solve this problem, the four questions are analyzed with text analytics software. We 
define several categories for understanding the types of information that firms provided in the 
survey to the detailed questions regarding Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions. From 2003 - 2006, the 
number of firms responding to each question are tallied: “Numerical Responses”, “WRI GHG 
Protocol”, and “Unanswered”. “Numerical Responses” refers to firms that used quantitative 
information in their answer. Our analysis counted any response that included a number as a 
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“numerical response”, which also included responses that mentioned a year (e.g., “1999”).“WRI 
GHG Protocol” includes firms responding with keywords referencing the World Resources 
Institute’s greenhouse gas protocol. “Unanswered” counts the firms that left the question entirely 
blank.  For 2007 - 2010, the categories are “Numerical Responses” and “Unanswered”. 
In the questions pertaining to external verification, firms selected their response from a drop-
down list supplied by the CDP. For 2007 and 2008, the categories in the list were “Yes”, “No”, 
and “Unanswered”. In 2009, a category was added for the response, “No information provided in 
applicable questions”, referring to firms that did not provide any information in the emissions 
questions. In 2010, the CDP divided responses according to the three emissions scopes. Seven 
categories exist for each scope: “Not Verified”, “More than 0%, but less than 20%”, “More than 
20%, but less than 40%”,  “More than 40%, but less than 60%”, More than 60%, but less than 
80%”, “More than 80%, but less than 100%”, and “Unanswered”. The number of firms included 
in each category is recorded. The percentage of firms responding to each category is calculated 
by dividing number of responding firms by the total firms for that year.  Below, we discuss 
trends from 2003 to 2010 in the disclosure and verification of carbon emissions, shown in Table 
2. 
A second technique in measuring response convergence is the use of a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). Originally, the HHI was developed to measure industrial concentration in markets 
(Hirschman, 1964). In this study, we employ the HHI to measure the concentration of the most 
frequently used keywords and phrases over time.  Using the HHI, we determine whether the 
lexicon regarding climate change is converging based on changes in “market share” among terms 
used in reporting.  
The keywords and phrases are generated from responses to questions in CDP2007-CDP2010 that 
inquired about the accounting methodology the firms used to manage their greenhouse gas 
emissions. The CDP inquired about the Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions methodology separately 
from the Scope 3 emissions. For this study, we aggregate responses for Scope 1, 2, and 3 
emissions. After responses are aggregated for each firm, the responses are analyzed with SPSS 
Text Analytics for Surveys (STAS) software. We identify the top 200 “null concept patterns” for 
each year. As defined by STAS, “concept patterns” are a combination of frequently occurring 
keywords and “type”, a group of similar keywords. “Null concept patterns” (NCP) occur when a 
significant keyword occurs without the presence of a subsequent “type”. A list of the overall top 
200 NCPs is created by aggregating lists from 2007 - 2010. Of this list, the top 100 are retained 
for use in the HHI. 
Typically, the HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the market share of every firm in a 
market. In this study, we analogously calculate the percentage share using each of the NCPs each 
year. Each of these yearly percentage shares are squared and summed to produce an annual HHI 
value. As lexicon concentration increases, the HHI score also increases. We expect that the HHI 
score will increase as the language used in firm responses to the CDP converges. 
6. Results 
We divide discussion of the results into two sections: 2003 – 2006, and 2007 – 2010, due to 
dramatic changes in the questionnaire and sample size. 
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2003 – 2006 (See Table 2 below) 
Between 2003 and 2006, the total number of firms answering the survey and providing 
quantitative responses to Scope 1, 2, and 3 increased dramatically. However, the percentage of 
firms providing quantitative responses increased only moderately. The quality of responses, at 
least for Scope 1 and 2 emissions, improved. Between 2003 and 2006, both the number and the 
percentage of firms referencing the WRI Greenhouse Gas Protocol in their accounting 
methodology increased dramatically, while the number and percentage of firms skipping the 
question or leaving it blank decreased dramatically. From 2003 – 2006, the share of firms 
referencing the WRI GHG protocol for Scope 1 and 2 more than tripled, and the share skipping 
the emissions questions fell by two thirds. Interestingly, Scope 3 emissions did not follow a 
similar trend; Scope 3 emissions reporting remained flat.  
<<insert Table 2 about here>> 
2007 – 2010 (see Tables 3 - 7 below) 
Between 2007 and 2010, a complex picture of trends in transparency emerges. Despite a 
gradually increasing sample size of firms releasing responses publicly, the number and 
percentage of firms providing quality information for Scope 1, Scope 2, and emissions from 
employee business travel (part of Scope 3) increases. In contrast, the percentage of firms 
providing quality lifecycle analysis or supply chain data does not increase (though the total 
number of firms providing these data increases).  
When the overall trends in the public disclosure of data and industry and country / region trends 
are considered, a more pessimistic view of transparency emerges. Between 2007 and 2010, the 
vast majority of new firms providing responses to the CDP survey did not make their responses 
public (see Table 1). Despite the number of firms responding to the CDP more than doubling 
from 2007 to 2010 (from 1449 to 3050 firms), the share of responses that were public fell from 
63.4% to 43.2%. 
Country and industry trends show similarly mixed patterns in transparency. Of firms providing a 
publicly available response, European Union based firms and Japanese firms have generally 
increased the quality of responses. U.S. firms, in contrast, increased the quality of responses 
through 2009, but in 2010 only 24.6 percent of firms provided numerical Scope 1 and Scope 2 
data, in contrast to 58.4 percent in 2007 and 81.8 percent in 2009 (see Table 5). Industry trends 
reveal a mixed picture, as well as a lack of consistency. Materials, industrials, and information 
technology sectors have the largest gains of transparency – all with over 20 percent gains 
between 2007 and 2010. Energy firms and consumer staples remain highly transparent 
throughout the sample years. Financials, consumer discretionary, and utilities remain relatively 
unchanged, and telecommunications and healthcare sectors decrease their transparency (see 
Table 4). 
Table 6 does not show a clear trend towards increased verification of emissions data between 
2007 and 2010 among those firms providing publicly available responses. The changing question 
formats over time limits the analysis of verification trends. In 2010, the question changes to 
exclude firms that did not provide information in the first place and to allow for partial 
verification of emissions. In 2010, 44.4 percent, 38.4 percent, and 21.0 percent of firms report at 
least partial verification of Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions, respectively. 
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In order to determine whether there was a clear convergence of the discourse regarding carbon 
management and climate change, we examine our lexicon concentration measurement, which 
mimics the HHI methodology. We calculate the “market share” of each keyword based on the 
list of the top 100 keywords and phrases used by respondents in the accounting methodology 
sections of the CDP surveys. As demonstrated in Table 7, from 2007 to 2010, the market share of 
the top 100 keywords and phrases increased from 184 to 357. Corporate discourse regarding 
climate change has converged recently. That the concentration or convergence in lexicon 
increased despite more firms participating in the CDP indicates an especially strong trend. 
In addition, we demonstrate the total share of firms reporting the use of a wide variety of 
standards and carbon accounting methodologies. As Table 8 shows, usage of the WBSCD / WRI 
protocol has increased from 45 percent in 2007 to 63 percent in 2010. More tellingly, however, 
the usage of the top four accounting methodologies has dominated the increase of use of 
accounting methodologies. WBSCD / WRI, IPCC, DEFRA, and ISO are the only standards to 
have garnered more than 10 percent of the total firms. Most of the other standards have failed to 
gain traction. Interestingly, only the top 5 standards, plus CCAR, received more than 1% market 
share and experienced a consistently increasing “market share” of standards use over time.  
Appendix B offers a comparison of several of these methodologies, and Appendix C and D give 
region and industry breakdowns of the standards, respectively..  
<<insert Table 3 about here>> 
<<insert Table 4 about here>> 
<<insert Table 5 about here>> 
<<insert Table 6 about here>> 
<<insert Table 7 about here>> 
<<insert Table 8 about here>> 
7. Discussion 
These results present a decidedly mixed perspective regarding the transparency of firms related 
to carbon management and accounting, supporting previous studies that found similar 
characteristics within a smaller sample (Sullivan, 2009). There are numerous signs of improved 
management by firms; there are also many signs that suggest that transparency gains achieved by 
the CDP in early years have failed to produce a lasting trend towards transparency. Responses 
from CDP participants in more recent years are overwhelmingly private, rather than publicly 
disclosed. There is little evidence that firms have increased external verification, and in the U.S. 
the quality of emissions reporting decreased substantially in 2010 (perhaps in response to 
reduced political expectations of carbon regulation). These results are similar to other studies that 
suggest wide variation in assurance and verification quality (Fonseca, 2010; Cerin, 2002). Firms 
that have large Scope 1 and Scope 2 carbon footprints including materials, industrials, energy 
firms, and consumer staples have been most likely to disclose carbon-related data. Industries 
without large direct carbon impacts – such as hospitals, financials, and telecommunications, have 
been less forthcoming with data, consistent with theory suggesting that firms that have the most 
carbon related regulatory risk ought to be the most likely to disclose data (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006). However, the largest emitters of all, utilities, continue to remain relatively opaque. 
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Among firms making their responses public, firms have been increasingly likely to employ a 
standardized accounting methodology and report numerical data in response to Scope 1, 2, and 3 
emissions queries. This suggests that firms are paying closer attention to carbon management. 
Improved information is certainly a step towards improved management. It is unclear, however, 
whether increased transparency and better data are the result of the Carbon Disclosure Project, or 
are simply reflecting broader changes in carbon management. It is possible that by asking firms 
to report certain information, firm managers begin to collect that information. This hypothesis is 
supported by data in 2005 and 2009, where large spikes of transparency are reported the year 
after the year of a big expansion of the sample size. Even though CDP participants may not 
know the answer to new reporting questions upon first encountering them, they learn fast and 
response rates are much higher the next time around. 
For example, between 2003 and 2004, the number of firms increased more than 50 percent, from 
146 to 226 firms. This dramatic increase happened again between 2005 and 2006 (and again in 
2007). In 2005, however, when the number of firms increased only slightly over 2004, 80.8 
percent of firms provided quantitative responses to Scope 3 emissions, up from 49 percent in 
2004.  Only two (four) firms did not answer Scope 1 and 2 emissions (Scope 3 emissions), down 
from roughly double that number in the prior year. In 2009, another year where the sample size 
had not increased (it actually decreased), the response to Scope 1 emissions jumped from 53.8 
percent in 2008 to 74.8 percent in 2009. Scope 2 emissions reporting jumped from 49.3 percent 
in 2008 to 71.3 percent in 2009. Thus, in the year after a spike in sample size, larger spikes in 
transparency appear. 
The increase of transparency related to Scope 1 emissions is unsurprising. Mandatory regulations 
in Europe, Japan, Australia and many U.S. states have forced firms to at least report, if not 
control, Scope 1 emissions. In the EU, where a cap-and-trade program has been implemented 
through the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, most firms must control but do not 
have to disclose direct emissions publicly. Yet, even there, Scope 1 emissions reporting rates far 
exceed the US level. 
More interestingly, reporting of Scope 2 emissions has burgeoned, and Scope 3 emissions has 
increased in some areas, while in others has remained relatively stable (again, suggesting an 
increase in the number of firms reporting, but a constant percentage). These trends suggest a 
more important role for the Carbon Disclosure Project. In 2007, 48.6 percent of firms reported 
indirect emissions, which includes electricity usage. By 2010, 67.6 percent of firms reported 
indirect emissions. Trends in Scope 3 emissions reporting have been more mixed. In 2007, 17.8 
percent of firms reported emissions from business travel, increasing to 44.2 percent in 2010. The 
percentage of firms reporting distribution-related emissions increased by 3 percentage points, 
from 9.7 percent to 12.8 percent. Again, because these numbers are percentages of an increasing 
sample size, they mask the increase in the total number of firms reporting this sustainability data 
publicly. 
Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions speak to a broader sustainability role for carbon management. 
Because electricity use and fuel use are frequently substitutes and the product life cycle, supply 
chain, business travel, and distribution of products may have a much bigger carbon footprint than 
the direct emissions of a firm, these measurements provide important information to stakeholders 
and shareholders about the firm’s carbon-related activities. The increase in reporting is an 
important sign that, at the very least, firms are beginning to pay attention to their carbon footprint, 
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are defining their carbon footprint in a much broader sense than just direct emissions, and are 
thus considering how they might be able to manage their carbon footprint better. 
The results from the HHI calculation of keyword and phrase concentration by firms points 
towards a convergence of management language. The types of keywords and phrases in this 
analysis generally refer to management techniques, measurement techniques, and reporting 
standards. The top 100 keywords and phrases were much more common in 2010 than they were 
in 2007, suggesting that the lexicon is becoming more standardized, and firms have moved 
towards similar measurement and reporting standards. This is supported, in part, by the increased 
use of the World Resources Institute Greenhouse Gas Protocol between 2003 and 2006 for Scope 
1 and 2 emissions, and by the presence of the WRI GHG protocol as one of the top keywords 
between 2007 and 2010. Other standards and protocols received significant attention between 
2007 and 2010, such as the IPCC, the DEFRA standards, and the ISO standards. This indicates 
that there might be institutional, regional, or industrial convergence towards competing standards. 
Regardless (and perhaps more importantly from a carbon management perspective), these 
“competing” standards may not be all that competing. The DEFRA and ISO standards are 
designed to be relatively compatible with the WBSCD / WRI guidelines, which, in turn, were 
developed to be compatible with the IPCC guidelines. As these standards gain traction, it ought 
to make carbon management more transparent and bolster stakeholder faith in the numbers that 
are reported to the CDP. 
Nevertheless, we were hampered by a CDP survey that changed nearly each and every year, as 
well as a changing sample. The CDP changed the types of information they were requesting over 
time, as well as the format in which the questions were asked. Sometimes, they provided drop-
down menus. Sometimes, they dropped questions. In 2009, for example, the CDP did not ask, 
specifically, about Scope 3 emissions. Many times, they added questions or attempted to extract 
more specific information from investors.  
On one hand, the changes in the CDP format often seemed reasonable. They have increasingly 
moved from open-ended responses, where firms often appear to cut and paste large amounts of 
(often irrelevant) information, to multiple choice answers that force firms to provide specific 
types and formats of answers. They have seemed to adapt to circumstances where firms were 
providing irrelevant information by structuring the questions differently and by asking for more 
specific types of information. 
On the other hand, shifting the questions each and every year greatly complicates tracking data 
over time. Considering the time, effort, and sophisticated text analytics necessary just to extract 
comparable information across years (exclusive of time and expertise in analyzing it) at least 
calls into question the purpose of the CDP’s disclosure or transparency program (Bae et al., 
2010). We had to align questions across years, and, even then, we still had to omit 2009 from 
part of the analysis, and 2003 – 2006 is not comparable to 2007 – 2010. This discord is evident 
in some of the survey responses themselves. While most firms have improved their responses 
over time, the changing nature of the survey seems to undermine the responses of others. 
Caterpillar, for example, provided very specific and detailed information early on in the survey, 
but in later years provided a nearly irrelevant corporate sustainability statement. Because firms 
are frequently graded on whether or not they respond to a question rather than the quality of their 
responses (partly due to the lack of standardization in the survey), and because responses may 
not be particularly useful to investors or researchers, there may be insufficient motivation to 
provide detailed information to the CDP.  
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8. Conclusions and directions for further research 
In contrast to much existing research, this research engages in a longitudinal study of  corporate 
transparency data and takes into account the quality of firm responses. This research makes 
advances in both the quantity and quality of information assessed related to very specific 
disclosures of carbon related activities.  
The trend towards keeping responses private, rather than public, is potentially alarming from a 
perspective that sees transparency as a key to improved management. It also raises many 
questions regarding the quality of private responses versus those released publicly, as well as the 
potential impact on firms from awareness in the broader public, versus the impact from 
institutional investors.  
If firms are graded simply on whether or not they answer a question, rather than the quality of 
their responses, firms will likely avoid the disclosure of quality information. The reasons behind 
the enormous and recent drop-off in quality responses from US firms are unclear. On one hand, 
firms may have anticipated changes in the political environment, leading them to strategically 
avoid disclosure. On the other, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has begun 
requiring a similar, but mandatory, disclosure, perhaps making the CDP obsolete. It is unclear 
the extent to which the SEC guidelines will mimic the CDP efforts. Similarly, mandatory 
reporting requirements in part of the EU ETS may obviate the need for a voluntary reporting 
database for Scope 1 emissions. 
These developments suggest a tradeoff between voluntary and mandatory reporting regimes. 
While mandatory reporting requirements may be an effective way to force disclosure of direct 
emissions, voluntary disclosure program like the CDP may allow firms to engage with 
stakeholders such as investors and employees more directly than mandatory reporting 
requirements and serve as a way to improve internal management of greenhouse gases (Stanny 
and Ely, 2008).  
The decrease in transparency by U.S. firms in 2010 raises many questions regarding the viability 
of a voluntary disclosure program. If firms participate in a voluntary program to deflect the 
enactment or enforcement of a more stringent mandatory program (Lyon and Maxwell, 2004), 
the success of a voluntary program is at best a second-best solution that is dependent upon 
political pressure for more stringent mandatory programs.  
However, by encouraging voluntary reporting and disclosure, the CDP gives firms a way to 
distinguish themselves from competitors and gain recognition for going beyond compliance. In 
contrast, participation in a mandatory reporting environment, such as the EU ETS (which does 
not make direct emissions public), reduces incentives for moving beyond compliance. In addition, 
the CDP has a unique role in promoting the disclosure of Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions, which 
are unlikely to be addressed through mandatory regulation or disclosure rules. 
Finally, the CDP – as well as other efforts to encourage greenhouse gas reporting and 
verification – have helped establish norms for carbon accounting methodology. Some of the 
strongest evidence for convergence in this study related to the specific standards employed for 
carbon accounting methodology. That firms have converged to use specific methods for carbon 
accounting, without the coercive force of government demonstrates an important role for 
voluntary initiatives like the CDP in achieving consensus regarding reporting standards. The 
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learning proces by participating firms seems especially promising, as reporting imporves soon 
after joining.   
Nevertheless, the complexity and changes to the CDP survey have made it particularly difficult 
to assess CDP responses, despite the rich information collected by the organization. A voluntary 
disclosure program, unlike a mandatory one, might allow for less uniformity and standardization 
and hamper comparability over time and across firms. (In contrast, the freedom afforded firms in 
reporting through the CDP allows us to observe the ‘natural’ convergence in reporting in a 
voluntary system.)  We acknowledge that the CDP is attempting to improve their methodology 
and assessment techniques. The CDP has begun to grade firms based on the content of their 
responses, though too frequently this is still conducted as a binary measurement based on 
whether a firm has provided information in response to a question. More attention needs to be 
directed towards generating a survey and response system that is consistent over time and 
collects more usable information.  
Due to our focus on improving the types of information gathered from the CDP survey and the 
challenges in extracting that information, we have not begun to parse patterns in the responses or 
the non-responses. Future research should seek to assess how individual firms change their 
responses over time and which firms withhold information. We can assess which types of firms 
are converging on different standards, and correlate the content of responses with shareholder 
value or measurements of observed environmental performance. Significant uncertainty remains 
regarding whether reporting and verification reflects actual firm behavior (Kolk and Pinkse, 
2010; Fonseca, 2010), or whether it is simply an exercise in public relations (Cerin, 2002). 
Recent findings suggest that improved disclosure and management are correlated with higher 
toxic releases and lower environmental compliance (Delmas and Blass, 2010), suggesting that 
improved disclosures may not correlate with improved environmental performance. 
We demonstrate a mixed trend towards increasing disclosure and increased transparency, with 
some areas – especially in the area of unregulated Scope 2 activity – suggesting improvements in 
transparency. Other areas – including the verification of disclosed information – suggest a lack 
of improvement. There is some convergence in specific accounting methodologies. This research 
contributes to previous findings that do not demonstrate increasing transparency over time, and 
contributes to the convergence / divergence debate. While on the whole we demonstrate 
convergence in the types of information supplied and the lexicon used by firms that make their 
responses publicly available, future research should seek to further parse convergence patterns.  
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Table 1: Firm Counts in Carbon Disclosure Project Sample by Year 
 
 
CDP Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Public 
Firms 
146 226 265 588 952 1061 1247 1513 
Total 
Respondents 






















































































































































































Numerical Response 99 67.8% 72 49.3% 
WRI GHG Protocol 11 7.5% 4 2.7% 
Unanswered 21 14.4% 21 14.4% 
CDP 
2004 
Numerical Response 180 79.6% 110 48.7% 
WRI GHG Protocol 36 15.9% 9 4.0% 
Unanswered 5 2.2% 7 3.1% 
CDP 
2005 
Numerical Response 170 64.2% 214 80.8% 
WRI GHG Protocol 17 6.4% 17 6.4% 
Unanswered 2 0.8% 4 1.5% 
CDP 
2006 
Numerical Response 440 74.8% 313 53.2% 
WRI GHG Protocol 143 24.3% 16 2.7% 






































































































CDP 2007 Numerical Response 55.6% 48.6% 17.8% 9.7% 8.2% 6.1% 
Unanswered 44.4% 51.4% 82.2% 90.3% 91.8% 93.9% 
CDP 2008 Numerical Response 53.8% 49.3% 24.4% 10.0% 7.2% 6.2% 
Unanswered 46.2% 50.7% 75.6% 90.0% 92.8% 93.8% 
CDP 2009 Numerical Response 74.8% 71.3% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Unanswered 25.2% 28.7% 
CDP 2010 Numerical Response 68.0% 67.6% 44.2% 12.8% 7.0% 6.2% 





Table 4: Scope 1 Emissions Reporting for CDP2007-CDP2008 (Percent by Industrial 
Sector) 
 CDP2007 CDP2008 CDP2009 CDP2010 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
51.4% 49.6% 69.8% 56.4% 
Consumer Staples 71.6% 66.3% 89.7% 78.2% 
Energy 64.3% 62.1% 82.4% 75.9% 
Financials 64.0% 49.5% 61.8% 56.6% 
Health Care 43.5% 37.0% 17.5% 28.8% 
Industrials 45.0% 48.1% 77.4% 69.7% 
Information 
Technology 
60.0% 55.3% 79.6% 80.3% 
Materials 53.2% 61.6% 84.1% 75.9% 
Telecommunications 51.1% 44.7% 19.2% 27.0% 




Table 5: Scope 1 Emissions Reporting for CDP2007-CDP2008 (Percent of firms reporting 
in region) 
 
 CDP2007 CDP2008 CDP2009 CDP2010 
Europe 56.8% 58.1% 79.8% 65.7% 
Japan 56.2% 62.8% 54.5% 76.9% 
Other 60.2% 43.0% 67.6% 62.0% 






























Table 7: HHI index of top 100 keywords (2007 - 2010) 
 



































































































































2007 44.9% 4.0% 4.7% 1.4% 3.6% 1.4% 0.8% 3.4% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% 0.9% 1.8% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 
2008 47.4% 6.6% 6.2% 4.0% 4.2% 2.9% 2.2% 3.8% 1.8% 2.2% 1.4% 1.7% 1.7% 0.7% 0.4% 0.5% 
2009 59.7% 10.7% 9.4% 9.0% 6.5% 5.0% 4.6% 4.6% 3.9% 3.5% 3.3% 3.2% 2.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 




Appendix A: Descriptions of Selected Protocols 
WBSCD/WRI Greenhouse Gas Protocol 
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development/ World Resources Institute 
(WBSCD/WRI) Greenhouse Gas Protocol is developed in collaboration with multiple private, 
public, and non-governmental organizations to provide an internationally recognized standard for 
accounting and reporting greenhouse gases (WBSCD/WRI, 2004).  The Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol publishes standards for multiple aspects of greenhouse gas accounting, including the 
GHG Protocol Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard, GHG Protocol Project 
Quantification Standard, and a recently released standard on Scope 3 emissions.  
International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000 (ISAE 3000) from the 
International Federation of Accountants 
The ISAE 3000 was created by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) to provide professional accounting instructions to public practitioners of accounting. It 
is not explicitly developed to address environmental management or greenhouse gas emissions, 
but the framework is adaptable. It seeks to establish convergence upon an international, 
professional accounting standard for assurance engagements other than audits or reviews of 
historical financial information (IAASB, 2008). 
International Organizations for Standardization (ISO) 
The ISO is a Geneva based NGO made up of standards institutes from 162 countries. It claims to 
be the largest developer and publisher of international standards. ISO partners represent both 
private and public interests. They have published hundreds of standards at present, and many 
have been referenced in the CDP. All standards are voluntary and developed for areas where 
there is a definite market requirement (ISO, 2011). 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 
Though the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, GRI (established in 1997) seeks to promote 
sustainability by encouraging greater transparency of the impacts of firm activities. GRI 
develops its reporting framework through consultation with actors in a network of diverse 
stakeholders (business, investors, labor, civil society, accounting, academia, and others). Unlike 
other standards, this framework provides guidelines for accounting economic and social impacts, 
in addition to environmental impacts (Global Reporting Initiative, 2011). 
AA1000AS (2008) Assurance Standard from Accountability 
In 2003, the AA1000 was published by AccountAbility as the world’s first sustainability 
insurance standard. It was developed in collaboration with international stakeholders, such as 
investors, businesses, and NGOs. Sustainability insurance addresses the adherence to AA1000 
Accountability Principles and the quality of disclosed information pertaining to sustainability. It 
is intended to be used by sustainability insurance practitioners, report preparers, and users of 
sustainability reports.  AccountAbility is a nonprofit, international network dedicated to 
encouraging accountability innovations related to sustainability (AccountAbility, 2008). 
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EPA Climate Leader Standards 
From 2002 to 2011, the EPA Climate Leaders program was a partnership between the EPA and 
private firms to improve the environmental performance of American businesses. The Climate 
Leaders program differed from the GHG Protocol as it was a program based out of the United 
States dealing directly with setting environmental performance goals and recognizing related 
leadership and achievement of American businesses (Environmental Protection Agency, 2011), 
as opposed to international greenhouse gas reporting and accounting standards. Following 
September 2011, the Climate Leaders program was ended in response to the maturity of alternate 
state and NGO operated climate programs, as well as a new EPA Greenhouse Gas Reporting 
Program (McCarthy, 2010).  
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
Inspired by the Kyoto Protocol, EU ETS was established in 2005 as a mandatory cap and trade 
system designed for European Union member nations to reach their carbon reduction goals. As a 
carbon trading scheme, it quantifies carbon emissions through the use of a price mechanism. The 
total emission released by a firm is determined by how much carbon has been bought or sold 
(European Commission, 2009). 
California Climate Action Registry (CCAR) 
Developed by the California Registry (transitioning to the Climate Registry) in 2001 to 
encourage greenhouse gas emissions reporting, CCAR was a voluntary program of special 
interest to public, private, and environmental organizations. In December 2010, CCAR was 
officially closed. During its time, it received 863 verified Greenhouse gas emissions reports, 
including 972,802,087.81 metric tons CO2e of direct and indirect emissions(California Climate 
Action Registry, 2011). 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) 
Launched in 2003, CCX was the United States’ first carbon emissions cap and trade program. It 
reported 450 members and greenhouse gas emissions reductions of 700 million tons. In 2010, it 
ended its carbon emission program but launched the Chicago Climate Exchange Offsets Registry 
Program in January 2011 (Chicago Climate Exchange, 2011; Gronewold, January 3, 2011). 
Standards on Engagements (ASAE) 
ASAE is a product of the Australian Government Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(AUASB). As dictated by Australian law, the AUASB publishes the ASAE to establish 
“mandatory requirements and provides explanatory guidance for undertaking and reporting on 
assurance engagements other than audits or reviews of historical financial information covered 
by Auditing Standards (ASAs) or Auditing Standards on Review Engagements (ASREs)”  
(AUASB, 2007). 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines 
Established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) to provide the international community with scientific 
information pertaining to climate change, IPCC is responsible for publications pertaining to 
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greenhouse gas emissions accounting methodology, which are utilized by some responding firms 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2011). 
Carbon Trust Standard 
Since 2008, the Carbon Trust Standard has been produced by the Carbon Trust to promote 
accounting, management, and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of both public and private 
organizations. It is  influenced by WRI’s GHG Protocol and ISO 14064-1 and was developed 
with the help of major private and public organizations (Carbon Trust, 2011). 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS) 
EMS is produced by the US Environmental Protection Agency to provide guidance to firms 
trying to reduce their environmental impact. It is designed to help firms develop affordable 
environmental management programs (EPA, 2012) 
Third-Party Verification Standards 
Some firms mention, by name, a third-party contractor responsible for externally verifying their 
response. Common third-parties include: Price Waterhouse Coopers, Det Norske Veritas, 




Appendix B: Characteristics of Selected Protocols 




• Description of the company and 
inventory boundaries  
• Separate Scope 1 and 2 emissions data 
• Separate data for all 6 greenhouse gas 
emissions in metric tons and tons of 
CO2 equivalent 
• Separate data for direct carbon 
emissions from biologically 
sequestered sources 
• Methodologies used in calculation 
• Specific mention of excluded sources, 
facilities, and operations.   
“To develop internationally 
accepted greenhouse gas (GHG) 
Accounting and reporting 
standards for business and to 
promote their broad adoption” 
(WBSCD/WRI, 2004) 
ISO 14064-1 • Organizational level reporting 
• Project level reporting 
• Validation and Verifications 
• To encourage and promote 
consistency, transparency, 
and credibility in 
greenhouse gas reporting 
• To allow organizations to 
identify their sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions 
• To enable the trade of 
GHG allowances and 
credits 
• “support the design, 
development and 
implementation of 
comparable and consistent 
GHG schemes or 
programmes.” 
IPCC • Varies by Sector 
• Activity Data x Emissions Factors = 
GHG Emissions 
 
*Activity Data is human activity involved in 
creating emissions. Emissions factors are the 
quantifications of emissions units produced per 
unit of activity data 
IPCC aims to assist the Parties to 
the UNFCCC in “fulfilling their 
commitments under the UNFCCC 
on reporting on  
inventories of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by  
the Montreal Protocol, as agreed 
by the Parties” (IPCC, 2006). 
DEFRA Activity Data x Emissions Factors = GHG 
Emissions 
12 Recommendations: 
1. “Apply your chosen approach 
consistently and for most organisations 
this will be the financial control 
approach’ 
To assist UK organizations in : 
• Reducing contributions to 
climate change 
• Setting GHG Reduction 
targets 
• Measuring total GHG 
emissions (DEFRA, 2009)  
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2. “Measure or calculate your emissions 
on a global basis”. 
3. Report Scope 1 and 2. Scope 3 is 
optional 
4. “Measure or calculate emissions from 
the six GHGs covered by the Kyoto 
Protocol” 
5. “Where your organisation is using 
standard emission factors, you should 
use the Defra / DECC GHG conversion 
factors for UK emissions”. 
6. “Report total GHG emissions as a gross 
figure in tonnes of CO2e”. 
7. “Report purchased or sold emissions 
reductions that meet the ‘good quality’ 
emission reduction criteria. Then report 
a net figure in tonnes of CO2e, in 
addition to the gross figure”. 
8. “Report on total scopes 1 and 2 
emissions using an intensity ratio” 
9. “Provide supporting explanations” 
10. “Choose and report on a base year. 
Your base year should be either the 
earliest year that verifiable emissions 
data is available for [or] a single year, 
or a multi-year average (e.g. 2006-
2008)” 
11. “Develop a base year recalculation 
policy”. 
12. “Set a reduction target and choose the 






























































2007 0% 10.7% 0% 3.6% 1.6% 3.6% 1.3% 1.3% 41.1% 
2008 0.4% 12.8% 0% 3.6% 3.0% 6.2% 1.6% 4.2% 47.7% 
2009 1.2% 20.0% 0.2% 5.9% 6.9% 9.6% 2.4% 10.0% 54.7% 


























































2007 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2.7% 0% 0% 30.1% 
2008 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2.6% 0% 2.6% 30.8% 
2009 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.8% 0% 2.7% 10.7% 


























































2007 2.9% 0% 13.5% 0.4% 0.8% 2.9% 4.1% 0% 55.5% 
2008 8.2% 1.6% 17.0% 0.9% 0.9% 6.3% 3.8% 0.3% 61.0% 
2009 16.2% 1.3% 26.4% 0.7% 1.7% 10.6% 5.6% 2.6% 71.3% 
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2010 15.1% 3.9% 27.0% 0.0% 1.6% 6.9% 5.6% 3.0% 74.3% 
 

























































2007 0% 6.8% 2.7% 0% 1.4% 4.1% 0% 2.7% 45.9% 
2008 1.6% 6.3% 4.7% 0% 0.8% 6.3% 0% 3.9% 48% 
2009 0% 15.1% 7.5% 0.9% 3.8% 8.5% 0% 7.5% 58.5% 


























































2007 0% 6.2% 6.2% 1.2% 1.2% 8.6% 0% 0% 54.3% 
2008 4.0% 4.0% 6.9% 3.0% 3.0% 9.9% 0% 1.0% 66.3% 
2009 5.0% 9.0% 12.0% 4.0% 4.0% 16.0% 0% 4.0% 64.0% 


























































2007 1.4% 1.4% 0% 7.1% 7.1% 1.4% 31.4% 2.9% 51.4% 
2008 4.9% 1.0% 0% 7.8% 5.8% 6.8% 27.2% 3.9% 47.6% 
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2009 2.4% 3.5% 0% 10.6% 5.9% 9.4% 43.5% 8.2% 47.1% 


























































2007 0% 9.9% 2.0% 1.0% 2.5% 1.5% 0% 2.0% 38.4% 
2008 0.3% 13.4% 2.1% 0.3% 1.7% 3.8% 0% 4.8% 41.9% 
2009 0.7% 15.4% 2.6% 0.4% 2.6% 4.5% 0% 6.4% 46.1% 


























































2007 2.2% 0% 6.5% 0% 2.2% 0% 0% 0% 56.5% 
2008 5.6% 1.9% 9.3% 0% 0% 1.9% 0% 5.6% 57.4% 
2009 6.5% 4.8% 12.9% 0% 3.2% 6.5% 0% 8.1% 67.7% 


























































2007 0.7% 4.0% 4.6% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 0% 0.7% 41.1% 
2008 0.8% 5.8% 5.0% 0% 1.7% 4.1% 0% 3.7% 44.0% 
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2009 4.7% 11.1% 4.7% 1.7% 5.1% 8.5% 0% 10.3% 54.7% 

























































2007 3.1% 0% 9.2% 0% 0% 12.3% 0% 0% 52.3% 
2008 2.6% 1.3% 11.8% 0% 0% 14.5% 0% 5.3% 61.8% 
2009 5.6% 5.6% 13.9% 0.9% 1.9% 18.5% 0% 16.7% 65.7% 


























































2007 0% 1.1% 2.1% 2.1% 0% 9.6% 0% 3.2% 47.9% 
2008 1.6% 1.6% 2.4% 1.6% 2.4% 9.6% 0.8% 4.8% 37.6% 
2009 2.3% 2.3% 3.8% 3.0% 3.0% 16.7% 1.5% 6.1% 52.3% 


























































2007 2.2% 4.4% 0% 0% 0% 2.2% 0% 2.2% 37.8% 
2008 4.3% 4.3% 2.1% 0% 0% 4.3% 0% 4.3% 55.3% 
2009 7.7% 0% 7.7% 0% 3.8% 7.7% 0% 13.5% 57.7% 
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2007 1.3% 3.8% 5.0% 6.3% 0% 3.8% 0% 0% 40.0% 
2008 3.8% 5.7% 6.6% 7.5% 0.9% 13.2% 0% 3.8% 38.7% 
2009 12.7% 7.3% 7.3% 10.0% 6.4% 15.5% 4.5% 12.7% 40.0% 
2010 13.9% 7.4% 3.7% 12.0% 5.6% 13.0% 4.6% 9.3% 50.0% 
 
